Mr. President, the

world witnessed a diplomatic success in

United Nation’s Secretary General Kofi

Annan’s trip to Baghdad last weekend.

We saw a successful conclusion to an

episode that has been and probably will

continue to be a very long drama of

confrontation with Iraq. This success is

not due solely to Mr. Annan’s considerable

powers of persuasion. Mr. Annan’s

mission was backed by force—by the

real, credible potential for violent punishment

from U.S. forces if a diplomatic

solution was not achieved. He

said this about his successful negotiations:

‘‘You can do a lot with diplomacy,

but of course you can do a lot

more with diplomacy backed up by

firmness and force.’’ It takes nothing

away from Mr. Annan’s success to note

he shares star billing as a peacemaker

with the soldiers, sailors, airmen and

marines of the United States.

The smile of diplomacy combined

with the force of the gun has produced

an offer from Baghdad to allow U.N.

weapons inspectors into sites previously

denied to them by the Iraqi

government. For the moment there is

hope that air strikes to reduce Iraq’s

capacity to use weapons of mass destruction

will not be needed. Gratefully,

for now, we will not again be witnesses

to the necessary violence of

combat. The images of war, which increasingly

shape and limit our national

tolerance for war, will thankfully not

supplant Seinfeld on our TV screens

this week.

And yet our gratitude for peace is

not entirely satisfying. A sour taste remains

in our mouths. We wonder again

if Saddam Hussein has got the better of

us. The question nags: Did we win a

diplomatic battle but not the war?

These feelings and this question flow

from our national discussion of Iraq

policy over the past several weeks, especially

the growing realization that

America should not deal with the Iraq

problem episodically, but rather with

finality, even if greater effort is required.

This problem was eloquently stated

last Wednesday at Ohio State University

by a veteran. He said:

Mr. President, this veteran speaks

for me. He gave the nation a clarion

call to finish the job. It falls to us to

determine what finishing the job

means. We must do so with the understanding

that wherever and however we

stand in the gap, our stand and our actions

will be globally public. All of us

who are given power by the Constitution

to declare war and raise armies

must take note of how much is won or

lost over the airwaves.

We will not restrict the flow of images

in the next war as we have in the

past. The recently released CIA report

on the Bay of Pigs thirty-six years

after the report was written, represents

the old way of making: war in secret.

The new way is portable video cameras

and satellite communications opening

the battlefield to full view. And victory

may hinge more on the impressions of

the battle conveyed through the media

than on the effect of the combatants

themselves. Even if the struggle is only

diplomatic, it is no less public and

global, and the impression made on the

public who witness the struggle

through the media is at least as important

as the diplomatic outcome.

Television images are powerful and

effect all who watch. Two and one-half

billion people watched Princess Diana’s

funeral. Perhaps as many watched the

war of words between the U.S. and Iraq.

I am concerned that to date, we may be

losing this battle of the airwaves. A

ruthless dictator who has starved and

brutalized and robbed his people for

over twenty years actually appears in

some media to be more interested in

the welfare of his people than do we. To

win, we must have an objective that is

clear, will justify war’s violence if war

comes, and will enable us to rally

world opinion. We need a mission that

puts us in the gap not just to reduce a

threat but to liberate a people and

make a whole region secure and prosperous.

We need a cause which will

unite moral leaders like Nelson

Mandela, and Vaclav Havel with other

political and military leaders. We need

an objective which will permanently

remove the threat the Iraqi dictatorship

poses to the United States, to our

allies, to our interests, to its neighbors,

and to its own people.

The containment of Iraq—although it

has been a success—cannot be such a

cause. Containment reduced the Iraqi

military threat and introduced

UNSCOM inspections, which are our

principal means of limiting Saddam’s

production of weapons of mass destruction.

But the ultimate failure of containment

is signaled by the word ‘‘reduce’’

as a policy goal. With biological

weapons, reduction or limitation are

not sufficient. We need to be sure such

weapons are eliminated from Saddam’s

arsenal. To ‘‘reduce’’ is not enough.

Let me say a word about the fear

that has been aroused over the potential

of biological weapons, both Iraqi

weapons and possibly such weapons in

the hands of terrorists in this country.

Fear is a natural reaction, but fear is

also the great debilitator. Fear keeps

us from taking necessary action. We

must manage our fears, we must keep

fear from paralyzing us, and we must

realistically measure the threat posed

by these weapons. If we are to truly

stand in the gap with regard to Iraq, we

must do something hard: we must have

a broader perspective than just altering

our fear of biological weapons. We

must transcend that fear and convert

it into a hope for freedom. A democratic

Iraq is certainly in our interest,

an Iraq free of weapons of mass destruction

is certainly in our interest,

but it is above all for the sake of the

Iraqis that we must replace Saddam.

A review of what Saddam has done to

his people underscores the need to remove

him. After over 20 years of Saddam,

it is hard to recall that Iraq was

once the heart of the Fertile Crescent,

a country blessed with oil resources,

rich agricultural potential, and a vibrant

middle class. Through a disastrous

war with Iran and then the invasion

of Kuwait, Saddam mortgaged and

then caused the destruction of much of

Iraq’s oil capacity. Through static economic

policies, he marginalized a middle

class which has since been almost

wiped out by the effect of sanctions,

which is to say, by the effect of

Saddam’s behavior. Per capita income

in Iraq has dropped from $2,900 in 1989

to $60 today, in currency terms. The

dinar, which was worth three dollars in

1989, is now at the rate of 1,500 to one

dollar. Iraqis have seen their salaries

drop to five dollars a month, and their

pensions evaporate. We are also familiar

with the starvation and the permanent

health crisis he imposes on his

people while he builds palaces and

other grandiose monuments to himself.

Saddam’s policies have killed hundreds

of thousands of Iranians and

Iraqis and thousands of Kuwaiti citizens,

many of whom are still unaccounted

for. His reign of terror continues

to kill, including between 500 and

1,200 prisoners murdered in his prisons

last December. His weapons of mass destruction,

with which we are too familiar,

were tested on living human

beings, according to British press reports.

In sum, if there is a dictator in

the world who needs to be removed, it

is Saddam Hussein.

Force, either our own or that of dissident

Iraqis, will be required to remove

this regime. But in my view,

Desert Storm is not the model. A much

better example of the marriage of military

force with diplomacy, a success

story in the making, is the U.S. deployment

to Bosnia. An initial agreement

was reached at Dayton as a result of

the use of U.S. military force. Then our

troops led an allied force into the country

and provided, and continue to provide,

the overarching security and stability

beneath which a traumatized

people regain the confidence to govern

themselves democratically and live

civilly with each other. The lesson of

Bosnia is that force persuaded diplomacy,

which has in turn given the people

of Bosnia a chance for a lasting

peace. Iraq, with its devastated middle

class and ethnic divisions, may need

the same kind of long-term application

of potential force, once Saddam’s regime

has passed.

It took hope, at the worst moments

of the Yugoslav war, when Sarajevo

was a deadly obstacle course for its

citizens, to dream of a peaceful Bosnia,

and it took courage to make the commitments

which are now slowly bringing

that dream into reality. In the

same way, we must get past our pessimism

about Iraq and the Middle East,

summon our hope, and dream the successful

outcome of our policy: a democratic

Iraq. Imagine its characteristics:

a democratic Iraq would be at peace

with its neighbors. It would have no

weapons of mass destruction. A democratic

Iraq would enjoy the benefits of

its agricultural and oil wealth and

would share them equitably across

their society. A democratic Iraq would

be a tolerant society, in sharp contrast

to some of its neighbors. It would not

oppress its minorities. Its Kurdish population,

secure and free in northern

Iraq, would not be a base for an insurgency

against Turkey. A democratic

Iraq would be a powerful example to

the rising oil states of Azerbaijan,

Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, a

proof to them that a government can

use oil revenue for something other

than hiring police and buying weapons.

There is a dissonant sound to the

words ‘‘Iraq’’ and ‘‘democracy’’ side by

side, but this dream, aided by a sound

American strategy, can become real. I

know of no genetic coding that predisposes

the Iraqis, or any people, to

dictatorship. In November, I laid out a

road map which included the following

steps and I repeat them today.

First, we must convince our core European

and Asian allies that democracy,

not just the temporary compliance

of a dictator, is the right longterm

goal for Iraq. We must use the

facts about Saddam’s brutality to convince

our allies to support a transition

to democracy in Iraq, and to convince

them the security and economic opportunity

that would flow out of a new,

democratic Iraq is worth more than the

money owed our allies by Saddam’s regime.

In other words, we must convince

our allies to forgive the debts of a post-

Saddam Iraq. Beyond debt forgiveness,

we should clearly state the loan and

foreign assistance preferences which a

democratic Iraq would receive from

U.S. and multinational lending agencies.

Second, we should fill Iraqi airwaves,

by means of Voice of America and commercial

means, with the horrific truth

about Saddam’s regime. The Iraqi people

must learn that we know what Saddam

has done to them, and that weapons

of mass destruction are not our

sole concern. Two recent news stories

exemplify the kind of information we

should be putting in every Iraqi home.

The first, from the Los Angeles Times

for February 9, describes the murder of

up to 1,200 prisoners in Iraq’s main

prison. The second, from the January

18 Sunday Times of London, relates in

detail how Saddam’s government tested

biological weapons on human

beings. Mr. President, I ask unanimous

consent both these these articles be

printed in the RECORD at the conclusion

of my remarks.

Third, we should openly

and consistently state our goal of a

free, democratic Iraq, even if we have

to state it repeatedly for years. To accept

less and say less is simply unworthy

of our heritage.

Mr. President, there are additional

steps which are essential if we are to

achieve our goal:

We should announce our intention to

see Saddam Hussein indicted and tried

for war crimes and genocide.

As some commentators have suggested,

the United States should form

an umbrella organization of pro-democracy

Iraqi exile groups and support

them with money and military supplies.

When the exile group seizes significant

Iraqi territory, the United States

should recognize it as Iraq’s government

and make frozen Iraqi government

funds available to it.

The UN has already decided to expand

the amount of oil Iraq can sell in

exchange for food and medicine. We

should work with the UN to facilitate

greater amounts of life’s necessities

getting into the hands of the Iraq people.

Over the long term, we should consider

the usefulness of sanctions in

overthrowing Saddam. The debilitating

effect of sanctions on ordinary Iraqis

may actually help keep Saddam in

power. Our policies should serve the

strategy of removing this dictator from

office and creating the democratic Iraq

and peaceful Middle East which is our

goal.

Mr. President, I am laying out what

could be a long road for the United

States. But when you compare today’s

situation with tomorrow’s possibilities,

it is a road worth taking. It is a road

worthy of our heritage as liberators

and as a free people. Mr. Annan carefully

selected these familiar words to

describe the U.N.’s success this week:

‘‘We the peoples of the world can do

anything if united.’’ We have dreamed

the possibility. Now it is time for us to

make it real.

I yield the floor.